

## WAR IN THE ORIENT.

**The Condition of Port Arthur Becoming More Desperate Daily.**  
**Japanese Closing Around Mukden—The Czar to Put an Immense Army in the Field.**

### PORT ARTHUR.

**Fighting Resumed and Several Forts Probably Taken—Conditions Inside Desperate.**

#### SHORT OF COAL.

S. Davidson, an American merchant who had a Russian coal contract and was ordered to leave Port Arthur on Feb. 15 last, is now at Tsingtau. He says that when he left the coal supply was very much depleted.

On account of the Russian warships having been compelled to keep up full steam day and night for nearly eight months, and the enormous quantities of fuel required for the water-condensing plant, there must be a coal famine there now, unless more coal has arrived. The Japanese have since cut off the water supply and the garrison will have to depend entirely upon the condenser. If a coal famine prevails, the town must be getting water from impure wells, which would have to be served iceless to the sick and wounded.

#### AN ENGLISH WOMAN COMES OUT.

Mrs. Anna Kravtchenko, the English wife of a Russian army officer, arrived at Chee Foo the night of Sept. 17, with Lieut. Prince Radzivil, from Port Arthur. She is the first woman to run the blockade from the Russian side. The Japanese increased their vigilance to prevent egress from the port. Her trip was rendered extremely perilous, because she came out with the Prince and his companion, Lieut. Chertoukhov, and they were fired upon by the Japanese. She was rescued by Lieut. Gen. Stoessel, the commander at Port Arthur, to Gen.

### MUKDEN.

**The Japanese Within a Few Miles and Extending Their Flanks Around the City.**

Dispatches dated Sept. 19, received in Germany, say:  
 "The Japanese are advancing with a broad front, the left resting on the Liao River and the right on the mountains, probably the Fushan coal mines, 27 miles eastward. The Russian troops have recovered their spirits."

"The Japanese dispositions are completely changed and a line of outposts and it is almost impossible to obtain information from behind this veil. The Russians cannot tell which of the four routes the Japanese advance will follow. Three Japanese companies are patrolling the Hun River in junk. It is reported that Liao-yang is occupied by only one company and the heights northward of it by 2,000 men, the air in the vicinity of Liao-yang being poisoned by exhalations from thousands of unburied bodies. Field Marshal Oyama's headquarters is a short distance north of Liao-yang."

"The expenditure of ammunition at Liao-yang was enormous, the Russian artillery, Aug. 31, firing over 100,000 shots."

#### THE SITUATION OF THE FORCES.

The Russians are using war balloons southeast of Mukden for the purpose of observing the movements of the Japanese in that direction. The line of outposts extends for 16 miles south of Mukden, but not even the Chinese have been able to penetrate it. It is impossible, there-

## SPLENDID FEAT OF ARMS.

(Continued from page 1.)

managed by Bushrod Johnson's command, which, with the help of the Japanese, had been attacking as was advanced. Maj. Taylor and the other men who were inside the fort agreed in saying that the first men who entered the fort crossed the parapet where we did not expect them. They were there, but they were coming in, they retreated round the big traverse and fought those trying to enter the river half of the fort, and were fired on while doing that by our men, who mounted the traverse and shot at them from its top.

The idea of the movement against Fort Harrison seems to have been either to so take them by surprise as to enable us to reach Richmond by the north bank of the James, or to cause such a withdrawal of troops from Lee's right to oppose the movement as to materially assist Grant's operations on the north bank of the James. Our attack seemed to be because the troops were well formed, and there were enough of them to stand the loss inflicted by the enemy and still leave enough that could enemy after reaching the works.

#### OTHER MOVEMENTS.

The movement of the Tenth Corps toward the New Market road amounted to nothing, although there were some 10,000 men there, and the attack on Fort Gilmer failed disastrously because those who undertook it made successive charges with small numbers, a regiment or two at a time, instead of massing a sufficient force to take over it. Whatever was the intention of this movement to the north bank of the James, its result was simply to place us in possession of Fort Harrison, from which we extended lines north and south, and to oblige the rebels to make a new line connecting the James and the Appomattox and a partial new line from the same fort toward the New Market road.

On the 30th of September Gen. Lee brought Hoke's Division and other troops from the front of the James River, and rear of which a breastwork had been thrown up on the night of the 29th, and five brigades made two desperate charges, from both of which they were driven back with frightful slaughter, losing 2,000 men.

#### GEN. STANNARD'S CRITIC.

The Adjutant General of the brigade, who was there, told me that when we halted at the edge of the wood and saw Fort Harrison standing on its hill three-quarters of a mile off, Gen. Ord, after looking at it through his glass, turned to Stannard and said:

"General, that is too strong for us. We must wait for the other division."

"Oh, blazes! General. My division can take that fort," Stannard replied. "Very well," said Ord, "go ahead."

We went ahead, and the fort remained in our possession from that time to the end of the war.

#### GEN. ORD'S REPORT.

##### A Prompt, Secret Movement.

I have the honor to report that on the 28th day of September, 1904, in obedience to orders, I selected from my corps—then duty between the James and Appomattox rivers—about 4,000 men, from Gen. Stannard's and Heckman's Divisions, for a movement on the north side of the James against Richmond, in cooperation with another division of the same corps, composed of his corps and Paine's Division of mine; in all, that column was about 10,000 strong, and was designed to reach Richmond via Deep Bottom and the New Market road, and to prevent the movement of the enemy's forces, and prevent the interruption of Gen. Birney's column by reinforcements which the enemy might send across from the south side of the James River, and to prevent the movement of the enemy's forces. The movement was to be a surprise, therefore I issued no written orders, and my verbal orders were not communicated to the troops until after dark, when all communications were ceased with our own picket line. This precaution was deemed necessary to prevent the spies which abounded in our regiments from deserting and giving information of our movement to the enemy. On the night of 29th of September, at 9 o'clock on the night of Sept. 28, when the men were drawn out of the trenches and marched to the river opposite Alton's, where, between 9 and 12 p. m., they were thrown across the river. By 12 p. m. my troops were at the bridge, and before daylight were across the river and formed.

At the dawn of day I attacked the enemy's picket line with skirmishers, and though the rebels were reinforced, we drove them right along toward Richmond, up the hills, and for three miles through the woods, until about 7:30 a. m., when we reached the river. The picket line of Fort Harrison, the strongest rebel work on that front, which immediately opened upon us with several heavy guns. Here I reconnoitered and rapidly made dispositions to fight the battle. The enemy's division, Burnham's Brigade leading, was directed to push forward in column by division over the open in front of the fort, on the left of the "Arina road, covered with the same picket line, and so well driven the enemy's skirmishers. Heckman was directed, as soon as it could be brought up, to move with his division through and along the edge of the timber, which skirted the Virginia road, to the right, keeping his men under cover, until he came opposite to the fort (Harrison), and then attack it on the front toward the wood (that is, the east front) as rapidly as possible. This was accomplished, the principal work of the south and east, and had Gen. Heckman obeyed my orders many valuable lives would have been saved. The division, reaching the work after Stannard's division, which had been available to have attacked the only other work which intervened between us and Richmond in the rear; but he went too far into the woods, and his brigades scattered, and when found he was unable in the right place. Stannard's Division was ordered to advance across the open at quick time directly to the attack, and at double-quick time to reach the hill. This they did beautifully, and drove a little just at the foot of the hill which the fort crowned, when the fire of musketry and artillery was very severe. The enemy's division, which had been around me) to urge the men forward, followed them. The hill was ascended with heavy loss to us. Officers and men jumped down the ditch, followed along round so as to cut off the enemy's escape, and the extreme bastion, and helped each other to the parapet at that point. As soon as we entered the bastion or salient I caused the parts of the enemy's works to be thrown out; and reconnoitering, I saw through the smoke and fire what I supposed for some minutes was Gen. Heckman's column, which was next beyond Fort Harrison—Fort Gilmer, which was proved to be a large reinforcement of the enemy.

The men who had got into the fort were scattered here and there, and the ditch fighting the rebels, who had left the adjacent parts. I tried to gather a party and form them with a view to cutting off the enemy's escape, and to blind them and drive them out of the inside, but there were but few men to collect; all was confusion and excitement. The brigade which led in had lost nearly all its officers, and the command was in confusion. Nearly all the persons in the work were company officers, and with such I could collect I pushed toward the river, inside the work still occupied by the rebels, who were in command, and if possible, get possession of the pontoon bridge by which any reinforcements would have to cross to the fort. While doing so we were hit in the upper part of the leg, inside. Stannard was wounded with an improvised tomahawk. I continued in command until a Surgeon General, Heckman, turned back and sent for him, and told him to gather all the division (Stannard's), and occupy the work with it. He reported his own division (which had been in the rear of the enemy) to the right of and about half a mile from the road, just about to attack the work in front of it. I told him my orders were

to occupy such works as we took, and with staffs belonging to the 34th N. Y. L. A. A few rounds of canister sent the pursuing party quickly to cover, and my troops were quickly withdrawn to Battery Harrison, for better defense during the night.

During this movement Col. Donohoe, 10th N. H., commanding brigade, and Lieut. Col. Nichols, 118th N. Y., were both severely wounded. Col. Donohoe received a musket-ball in the right arm, which shattered the bone above the elbow and necessitated my removal from the field and amputation on my arrival at the hospital. A moment later Capt. Kent, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, who was on the way to inform the senior Colonel that he commanded the division, was struck by a musket-ball in the leg, incapacitating him to further duty, making the fourth officer of my staff disabled during two days' operations.

#### CASUALTIES.

My casualties during the day's operations were heavy in proportion to the strength of Division. My field return for 28th of September gave 3,115 men for duty. One regiment (5th Md.) had been left in camp, reducing this number by 290.

Of the 2,825 men who were engaged, my losses were as follows: Killed, 84; wounded, 408. Total, 492 killed and 492 wounded. Three hundred and thirty men were also reported as severely wounded. I took a number of captives from my command, and the command became somewhat mixed up during and immediately succeeding the assault. I think this number will be materially reduced, and I have not yet received the full list. By name, of the killed and wounded have been duly forwarded to the proper authorities.

A strong picket consisting of about one-half my command was thrown out immediately after sunset, and the remainder of the division occupied the line extending across the rear of Battery Harrison, and about 9 p. m., when I was relieved by the Third Division (Col. Donohoe's), commanded by Brig. Gen. Paine, and under orders from Brig. Gen. Heckman, commanding corps (Maj. Gen. Ord) having been obliged to leave the field in consequence of severe wounds.

I remained in the field, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested. No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested. No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

#### GEN. STANNARD'S REPORT.

##### An Early Morning March.

In pursuance to verbal orders received from Gen. Ord, commanding the corps, the division moved from its late camp, the division moved from its late camp, the division moved from its late camp, the division moved from its late camp.

On the 28th of September, and marched, without noise, in the direction of Gen. Stannard's division, and the division moved from its late camp, the division moved from its late camp.

On the 29th, in obedience to written orders received at that hour, the division, with Brig. Gen. Burnham's (Second) Brigade leading, crossed the James River near Alton's, and moved toward Richmond.

At the dawn of day I attacked the enemy's picket line with skirmishers, and though the rebels were reinforced, we drove them right along toward Richmond, up the hills, and for three miles through the woods, until about 7:30 a. m., when we reached the river.

The picket line of Fort Harrison, the strongest rebel work on that front, which immediately opened upon us with several heavy guns. Here I reconnoitered and rapidly made dispositions to fight the battle.

The enemy's division, Burnham's Brigade leading, was directed to push forward in column by division over the open in front of the fort, on the left of the "Arina road, covered with the same picket line, and so well driven the enemy's skirmishers.

Heckman was directed, as soon as it could be brought up, to move with his division through and along the edge of the timber, which skirted the Virginia road, to the right, keeping his men under cover, until he came opposite to the fort (Harrison), and then attack it on the front toward the wood (that is, the east front) as rapidly as possible.

This was accomplished, the principal work of the south and east, and had Gen. Heckman obeyed my orders many valuable lives would have been saved. The division, reaching the work after Stannard's division, which had been available to have attacked the only other work which intervened between us and Richmond in the rear; but he went too far into the woods, and his brigades scattered, and when found he was unable in the right place.

Stannard's Division was ordered to advance across the open at quick time directly to the attack, and at double-quick time to reach the hill. This they did beautifully, and drove a little just at the foot of the hill which the fort crowned, when the fire of musketry and artillery was very severe.

The enemy's division, which had been around me) to urge the men forward, followed them. The hill was ascended with heavy loss to us. Officers and men jumped down the ditch, followed along round so as to cut off the enemy's escape, and the extreme bastion, and helped each other to the parapet at that point.

As soon as we entered the bastion or salient I caused the parts of the enemy's works to be thrown out; and reconnoitering, I saw through the smoke and fire what I supposed for some minutes was Gen. Heckman's column, which was next beyond Fort Harrison—Fort Gilmer, which was proved to be a large reinforcement of the enemy.

The men who had got into the fort were scattered here and there, and the ditch fighting the rebels, who had left the adjacent parts. I tried to gather a party and form them with a view to cutting off the enemy's escape, and to blind them and drive them out of the inside, but there were but few men to collect; all was confusion and excitement.

The brigade which led in had lost nearly all its officers, and the command was in confusion. Nearly all the persons in the work were company officers, and with such I could collect I pushed toward the river, inside the work still occupied by the rebels, who were in command, and if possible, get possession of the pontoon bridge by which any reinforcements would have to cross to the fort.

While doing so we were hit in the upper part of the leg, inside. Stannard was wounded with an improvised tomahawk. I continued in command until a Surgeon General, Heckman, turned back and sent for him, and told him to gather all the division (Stannard's), and occupy the work with it.

He reported his own division (which had been in the rear of the enemy) to the right of and about half a mile from the road, just about to attack the work in front of it. I told him my orders were

to occupy such works as we took, and with staffs belonging to the 34th N. Y. L. A. A few rounds of canister sent the pursuing party quickly to cover, and my troops were quickly withdrawn to Battery Harrison, for better defense during the night.

During this movement Col. Donohoe, 10th N. H., commanding brigade, and Lieut. Col. Nichols, 118th N. Y., were both severely wounded. Col. Donohoe received a musket-ball in the right arm, which shattered the bone above the elbow and necessitated my removal from the field and amputation on my arrival at the hospital.

A moment later Capt. Kent, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, who was on the way to inform the senior Colonel that he commanded the division, was struck by a musket-ball in the leg, incapacitating him to further duty, making the fourth officer of my staff disabled during two days' operations.

My casualties during the day's operations were heavy in proportion to the strength of Division. My field return for 28th of September gave 3,115 men for duty. One regiment (5th Md.) had been left in camp, reducing this number by 290.

Of the 2,825 men who were engaged, my losses were as follows: Killed, 84; wounded, 408. Total, 492 killed and 492 wounded. Three hundred and thirty men were also reported as severely wounded.

I took a number of captives from my command, and the command became somewhat mixed up during and immediately succeeding the assault. I think this number will be materially reduced, and I have not yet received the full list.

By name, of the killed and wounded have been duly forwarded to the proper authorities.

A strong picket consisting of about one-half my command was thrown out immediately after sunset, and the remainder of the division occupied the line extending across the rear of Battery Harrison, and about 9 p. m., when I was relieved by the Third Division (Col. Donohoe's), commanded by Brig. Gen. Paine, and under orders from Brig. Gen. Heckman, commanding corps (Maj. Gen. Ord) having been obliged to leave the field in consequence of severe wounds.

I remained in the field, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested. No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

battery on the hill with a half battery of light 12's belonging to the 34th N. Y. L. A. A few rounds of canister sent the pursuing party quickly to cover, and my troops were quickly withdrawn to Battery Harrison, for better defense during the night.

During this movement Col. Donohoe, 10th N. H., commanding brigade, and Lieut. Col. Nichols, 118th N. Y., were both severely wounded. Col. Donohoe received a musket-ball in the right arm, which shattered the bone above the elbow and necessitated my removal from the field and amputation on my arrival at the hospital.

A moment later Capt. Kent, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, who was on the way to inform the senior Colonel that he commanded the division, was struck by a musket-ball in the leg, incapacitating him to further duty, making the fourth officer of my staff disabled during two days' operations.

My casualties during the day's operations were heavy in proportion to the strength of Division. My field return for 28th of September gave 3,115 men for duty. One regiment (5th Md.) had been left in camp, reducing this number by 290.

Of the 2,825 men who were engaged, my losses were as follows: Killed, 84; wounded, 408. Total, 492 killed and 492 wounded. Three hundred and thirty men were also reported as severely wounded.

I took a number of captives from my command, and the command became somewhat mixed up during and immediately succeeding the assault. I think this number will be materially reduced, and I have not yet received the full list.

By name, of the killed and wounded have been duly forwarded to the proper authorities.

A strong picket consisting of about one-half my command was thrown out immediately after sunset, and the remainder of the division occupied the line extending across the rear of Battery Harrison, and about 9 p. m., when I was relieved by the Third Division (Col. Donohoe's), commanded by Brig. Gen. Paine, and under orders from Brig. Gen. Heckman, commanding corps (Maj. Gen. Ord) having been obliged to leave the field in consequence of severe wounds.

I remained in the field, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested. No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

cupped, while Lieut. Burnham and Cook, with staffs, distributed the ammunition to the command. I mention this circumstance thus particularly because it was owing to the promptness with which my orders were obeyed and the gallant manner in which it was executed that my command was able to repulse the enemy's second and his successive assaults.

During the progress of this second attempt to capture our position, I received a musket-ball in the right arm, which shattered the bone above the elbow and necessitated my removal from the field and amputation on my arrival at the hospital.

A moment later Capt. Kent, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, who was on the way to inform the senior Colonel that he commanded the division, was struck by a musket-ball in the leg, incapacitating him to further duty, making the fourth officer of my staff disabled during two days' operations.

My casualties during the day's operations were heavy in proportion to the strength of Division. My field return for 28th of September gave 3,115 men for duty. One regiment (5th Md.) had been left in camp, reducing this number by 290.

Of the 2,825 men who were engaged, my losses were as follows: Killed, 84; wounded, 408. Total, 492 killed and 492 wounded. Three hundred and thirty men were also reported as severely wounded.

I took a number of captives from my command, and the command became somewhat mixed up during and immediately succeeding the assault. I think this number will be materially reduced, and I have not yet received the full list.

By name, of the killed and wounded have been duly forwarded to the proper authorities.

A strong picket consisting of about one-half my command was thrown out immediately after sunset, and the remainder of the division occupied the line extending across the rear of Battery Harrison, and about 9 p. m., when I was relieved by the Third Division (Col. Donohoe's), commanded by Brig. Gen. Paine, and under orders from Brig. Gen. Heckman, commanding corps (Maj. Gen. Ord) having been obliged to leave the field in consequence of severe wounds.

I remained in the field, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested. No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work, and my left rested.

No attempt was made by the enemy during the night to close the attempt to dislodge me from a position facing the river, with my right resting on Battery Harrison, and outside that work